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Abstract
Thispaper compares alternative liability rules forallo-
cating losses from defective products when consumers under-
estimate these losses and producers may have some market power.
If producers do not have any market power, the rule of strict
liability 'leads to both the first-best accident probabilityand
industry output. If producers do have some market power,strict
liability still leads to the first-best accident probability,
but there will now be too little output of the industry. It
is shown that if market power is sufficiently large, a negli-
gence rule is preferable. Under this rule,firms can still be
induced to choose the first-best accident probability, but now
the remaining damages are borne by consumers. Since consumers
underestimate these damages, they buy more than under strict
liability. However, there is a limit to how much the negligence
rule can encourage extra consumption. It is shown that if
market power is sufficiently large, the rule of no liability may
then be preferred to the negligence rule. Without any liability
imposed, producers will not choose the first-best accident
probability. However, this may be more than compensated for








It is widely recognized that consumers often misperceive the
risks from product failures and that, in many markets, producers
have some market power. Examples of markets in which both mis-
perceptions and market power occur might include those for
pharmaceuticals and other patented products, automobiles, tires,
farm machinery and aircraft.
The implications of consumer misperceptions for the optimal
choice of a product liability rule in a competitive market are
considered by Spence (1977) and Shavell (1980, pp. 14-16) ,among
others. They show that the rule of strict liability--in which
the producer is liable for all product failures regardless of
his care--is preferable both to the rule of negligence--in which
the producer pays damages only if he does not meet some standard
of care--and to the rule of no liability. The implications of
market power for the choice of a liability rule when consumers
have perfect information are discussed by Hamada (1976) and
Epple and Raviv (1978, pp. 83-87).1Theydemonstrate that,
in both competitive and monopolistic markets, strict liability,
negligence, and no liability are all equally desirable. The
results of these analyses might seem to suggest that when
consumer misperceptions and market power occur simultaneously,'
strict liability is the preferred remedy--it does best when con-
sumer misperceptions are the only problem and it does equally
well when market power is the only problem. We will show that
if consumers underestimate product risks, although strict lia-
bility is the best rule when market power is "low," negligence
will be preferred when market power is higher, and no liability—2—
may be superior when market power is higher yet.
The central idea developed in this paper follows from the
observation that shifting liability from producers to consumers
causes the demand curve to shift down by consumers' perceived
expected losses and producers' costs to fall by the actual
expected losses. Therefore, if consumers underestimate the
expected losses, costs will fall by more than demand, causing
output to increase. Thus, when producers have market power,
it may be desirable to take advantage of consumers' misperceptions
by shifting liability to them in order to offset the producers'
tendency to restrict output.' Of course, this shift may have
an undesirable effect on the producers' choice of the accident
probability, which must also be taken into account.
This paper considers two ways of shifting liability from
producers to consumer5. Under the rule of negligence, assuming
the standard of care corresponds to the first—best accident
probability, producers will meet it and therefore they will not
be liable for the accidents that still occur. Because of
consumer misperceptions, this will lead to a larger output
than under strict liability. Under the rule of no liability,
producers will have an incentive to choose a higher accident
probability than the first—best one because of consumer misper-
ceptions and, for reasons to be explained, they will produce an
even larger output than under negligence.
The circumstances under which each of the remedies may be
preferred can now be described. Suppose consumers underestimate
the accident probability and producers have no market power.—3—
Then the rule of strict liability leads to the first-best out-
come. By forcing producers to internalize all accident costs,
this rule leads them to choose the correct accident probability;
it also leads them to raise their prices to reflect the cost of
achieving this probability and the cost of bearing the remaining
damages, so that the appropriate output is demanded.
The rule of negligence is less desirable because it leads to a
larger output. And the rule of no liability is worse because it
leads to an even larger output and it results in
an excessive accident probability.
Now suppose market power increases, say due to an oligopoly
situation. Strict liability will still lead to the first—best
accident probability, but the positive degree of market power
will now result in too little output of the industry. A negli-
gence rule might be preferable because it increases industry
output without distorting the accident probability. In fact,
it will be shown that if market power is sufficiently large, the
negligence rule will be preferable to the strict liability
rule.
Finally, suppose market power increases even further, possi-
bly to the level under monopoly. Then, in order to offset the
greater effects of market power, it may be desirable to use
the rule of no liability because it generates larger output
even though it leads to an excessive accident probability.
An example will be provided in which, if market power is suffi-
ciently large, the no liability rule will be preferable to the
others. However, in a different example, no liability will be
shown to be inferior to the other remedies regardless of the
degree of market power.—4—
The preceding discussion has assumed that consumers
underestimate product risks. Alternatively, they may over-
estimate these risks. The same kind of reasoning leads tothe
conclusion that strict liability is always preferred inthis
case. The only reason to consider negligence or noliability
is to correct the problem of inadequate output due tomarket
power. But if consumers overestimate productrisks, this
problem will be exacerbated to the extent that damagesare
borne by consumers. Strict liability is thus the preferred
remedy regardless of the degree of market power.
Section 2 presents the model, which is then used in sec-
tion 3 to derive the accident probabilities and industryout-
puts under the three rules. Section 4 focuses onthe welfare
comparison between strict liability and negligence,while
section 5 focuses on the welfare effects of no liability.
Section 6 presents a numerical example which suggests thatthe
welfare loss from using the wrong remedy may be significant.
Section 7 discusses the results when consumers overestimate
the accident probability. Finally, section 8 considers
several extensions and interpretations of the analysis.—5—
2.The Model
Consumers are identical and risk neutral. Their aggregate
inverse demand for a perfectly safe good is assumed totake
3/ the form:—
(2.1) p =a — q.
If the good is not perfectly safe, let a be the true
probability of a product accident (or productfailure), and
let (l-A)a be each consumer's perception of a, where
o <A<1.Since A >0,consumers underestimate the true
accident probability. Larger values of A correspond tolower
estimates. Thus, A may be interpreted as a measure ofthe
extent of the misperceptions. Notice also thatconsumers'
perceptions are "unresponsive" in the sense that a changein
the true accident probability induces a smaller changein the
4/
perceived accident probability.—
Let 9 be the dollar loss to the consumer in the event
that one unit of the product fails. This loss includesthe
cost of repair and any damages resulting from
the failure. Assuming thatis the same for each unit of
the good consumed, the aggregate inverse demand for the
product when the perceived probability offailure is (l-A)a
is:
(2.2) p =a— — (l—A)a2.
Itis assumed that there are n identical firms, eachwith
constant marginal costs c(a), where c is strictlydecreasing—6—
and strictly convex, i.e., c' <0and c" >0.Let m =1/nbe
a rneasureof market power, ranging from 0 (the limiting conipeti—
tive case as the number of firms goes to infinity) to 1 (the
monopoly case)
Social welfare W is assumed to equal the benefit to con-





The first-best industry output and accident probability
are determined by maximizing (2.3), which will be assumed
to have a unique interior maximum, (q*, a*) .Thefirst—order
conditions with respect to q and a are:
(2.4) ci_q*_a*2 =c(a*),
(2.5) _cI(a*) =2.
The first condition states that, given the optimal accident
probability, industry output should be expanded until the
marginal value to consumers of the last unit, c-13q—a2, equals
the cost of producing that unit, c(a). The second condition
states that the probability of a product accident
should be reduced until the marginal benefit of the reduction
in the form of lower expected accident losses, 2, equals the
marginal cost of the reduction in the form of higher produc-
tion costs, _ct (a) .
Itwill be useful to provide another interpretation of
the optimal probability a*. First note that the sum of pro-
duction cost and expected accident loss, c(a) +a2,can be—7—
thought of as the full cost of the good.Thus, choosing an
accident probability that maximizes socialwelfare is equivalent
to choosing an accident probability thatminimizes the full
cost.—8—
3. Accident Probabilities and Industry Outputs
The equilibrium accident probabilities and industry outputs
under each of the liability rules will be calculated in the
following way. The inverse demand curve and the marginal cost
of each firm will first be described. These relationships
will then be used to determine each firm's profit as a func-
tion of its and other firms' accident probabilities and output
decisions. Equilibrium in the market is defined to be a set
of output and accident probability choices for each firm such
thateach firm is maximizing its profits taking the other firms'
choices as given.1
Strict liability. Under the rule of strict liability,
whenever a product failure causes a loss ofdollars to a
consumer, the producer must pay that consumerdollars.
Thus, since consumers are fully compensated for their losses,
they treat the good as if it were perfectly safe, regardless
of their misperceptions. Letting q. be the quantity chosen
by firm j, the aggregate inverse demand is then
n
(3.1) p =a— Lq.
j=l
Each producer's marginal costs now include the expected lia-
bility payment:
(3.2) c(a) +a.
Thus, firm i's profits are:
(3.3) rr. =[p—c(a.)—a.]q. 1 1 1 1—9—




Thenfirm i, taking all other firms' choices as given, chooses
its output, q1, and its accident probability, a1, tomaximize






An analogous set of first—order conditions appliesto every
other firm in the industry, resulting in 2n equations that
must be satisfied in equilibrium. The conditions correspond-
ing to (3.6) imply that each firm chooses itsaccident proba-
bility to minimize its marginal costs (3.2). Since,under
strict liability, the firm's marginal costs are the "full
costs" of the good, each firm chooses the first-best accident
probability:
(3.7) a =a*.
Now substituting a* for a into the conditions corresponding
to (3.5) yields n equations in n unknowns. By straightforward





Sincethere are n firms, industry output under strict liability
is:—10—
(3 9) =n —c(a*) — a*i
(l+n) L
Itwill be useful to compare industry output under strict
liability to the first—best level of output. Rewriting (2.4),





At one extreme--the monopoly case-—industry output is half of
the first—best output. As the number of firms increases,
industry output increases. In the limiting competitive
case, industry output equals the first-best level.
Thus, the problem under strict liability is not with the
safety levels chosen by firms, but with the restriction of
output due to market power.
Negligence. Under the negligence rule, firms have to pay
damages only if they do not meet some standard of care. This
standard corresponds in the present context to a particular
accident probability. A frequently cited legal principle
for determining the standard of care is the "Learned Hand rule,"
which can be interpreted as requiring that the standard
be set so as to minimize the sum of the cost of taking care
and expected accident losses.'1 In accordance with this
principle, it will be assumed that the standard of care is set
equal to the accident probability that minimizes the full
cost of the good--the first-best accident probability, a*.—11—
The inverse demand curve under negligence can be deter-
mined as follows. If firm i chooses its accident probability a1
at or below a*, then consumers bear their own losses andthe
price they are willing to pay for firm i's productwill
reflect this. If a. is above a*, firm j is liable forconsumers'
1
losses, so consumers will treat the good as if
it were perfectly safe. Thus, the demand faced by firm i is:
n







Similarly, firm i's marginal costs, including possible liability
payments, are:
c(a.), a. < a*,
1 1=
(3.13)
c(a.) +a.9., a. > a*.
1 1 1
Thus, firm i's profits are:
[a— (q. + q) —c(a.)—(1—A)a9]q,a < a*
J1
(3.14) ii. =




It can be shown that all firms will choose to just meet
the standard of carea*.V After substituting a* for a in
(3.14), equilibrium industry output can be derived as under
strict liability. The end result is that:—12—
(3.15) aN =a*,
and
(3 16) =_____ía — c(a*)—(1_A)a*9
(l+n) L
Underboth negligence and strict liability, firms choose
the first-best accident probability. Thus, the only effect of
moving from strict liability to negligence is to shift the
resulting expected accident losses from producers to consumers.
The consequence of this can be seen by comparing (3.16) to
(3.9), the corresponding condition for industry output under
strict liability; the only difference is that under negligence
consumers' perceived expected losses, (l_A)a*2, are sub-
stituted for the actual expected losses, a*S. Since consumers
underestimate accident losses, they buy more under negligence
than under strict liability:
(3.17) >
Noliability. Under the rule of no liability, since







and firmi's marginal costs are c(a) .
Bya derivation similar to that under strict liability
and negligence, it is straightforward to show that the acci-—13—
dent probability chosenby each firm under no liability satisfies
(3.19) —c' (a0) =(l—A)9..
In other words, firms provide safety until the marginal cost
of increased safety equals the perceived marginal benefit of
increased safety. Equivalently, firms choose the accident
probability a0 to minimize the perceived full cost,
c(a) +(l—X)a9.This is not surprising since, under no
liability, consumers' demand for the good is based on their
perceived accident losses.
Because the accident probability under no liability mini-
mizes perceived full cost and the first—best accident proba-
bility minimizes actual full cost, the two probabilities
are in general different. In fact, since c" >0,a compari-
son of (3.19) and (2.5) shows that:
(3.20) a0 >a*.
This result can be explained as follows. Suppose under no lia-
bility firms chose the first-best accident probability. By
definition, a small increase in the probability would lower pro-
duction costs by an amount just equal to the increase in actual
expected accident losses. However, since consumers' perceptions
are assumed to be unresponsive to changes in the true accident
probability, consumers perceive a smaller increase in expected
accident losses. Thus, it is profitable for firms to raise the
probability.
Industry output under no liability can be derived in a




Acomparison of (3.21) to (3.16), the corresponding result under
negligence, shows that different industry outputs under no
liability and negligence arise solely because different acci-
dent probabilities are chosen. Since a0 minimizes
c(a) +(1-X)a2,industry output under no liability exceeds
that under negligence:
(3.22) q0 >
Thiscan be explained in the following way. Under both
negligence and no liability, consumers bear their own losses.
Under no liability, firms have an incentive to choose the
accident probability which minimizes the perceived full cost
of the good-—the production cost plus perceived expected acci-
dent losses. Under negligence, however, firms are induced by
the standard of care to choose the first-best accident probability,
which results in a higher perceived full cost Thus, consumers
buy less under the negligence rule.




(3.24) q0 > q5,
and
(3.25) q* >
wherethe equality in (3.25) occurs only when market power is
zero. Under strict liability, the accident probabilityis the—15—
first-best one despite consumer misperceptions because firms
are forced to pay for all of their damages; industry output is
below the first-best level when there is market power. Under
negligence, firms meet the standard of care corresponding to
the first—best accident probability, so consumers bear their own
losses. Since consumers underestimate the expected losses,
they view the full cost of the good as less than understrict
liability and consequently buy more. Under no liability,firms
have an incentive to increase the accident probability above
the first—best level because consumers also underestimate the
increase in expected losses. Since consumers then view the
full cost of the good as less than under negligence, they buy
even more.—16—
4. Welfare Analysis I
Asnoted in the introduction, previous authors have
analyzed product liability remedies when, alternatively,
producers have no market power or consumers areperfectly
informed. Itwill be useful to reproduce versions of their
resultswithin our model before considering the more gen-
eral case when both market power and misperceptions occur.
Proposition 1: When there are consumer misperceptions
but no market power, strict liability is the preferred remedy
and leads to the first-best accident probability and industry
output.
Proof:Itis easy to see from section 3 that the limiting
values of the accident probabilities and industry outputs as





To understand this result, recall from section 3 thatthe
only possible problem with strict liabilityis that industry
output might be too low because of market power.But when
there is no market power, industry output equalsthe first—
best output. However, under negligence and no liability,
larger output levels are generated by consumermisper-
ceptions, as is an excessive accident probabilityunder no
liability.—17--
Proposition 2: When there is market power but no consumer
misperceptions, all three remedies are equally desirable and
lead to the first-best accident probability but to too little
industry output.
Proof: It is straightforward to show from section 3
that when A =0the accident probabilities and industry outputs




where the first equality in (4.4) occursonly whenmarketpower is zero.
Q.E.D.
The explanationof this result is as follows. Because
there are no consumer misperceptions, the incentive for firms
to choose too large an accident probability under no liability
disappears. Thus, all three remedies lead to the first-best
accident probability. Given the same accident probabilities
and no misperceptions, the full cost of the good is viewed
as the same under all three remedies. Thus, industry output
is the same. When there is market power, this output is less
than the first-best output.
For reasons mentioned in the introduction, it does not
follow from the preceding propositions that strict liability
is the preferred remedy when both market power and consumer
misperceptions occur together. In general, any of the three
remedies might be the preferred one. The combinations of—18—
market power and misperceptions for which each of the remedies
is preferable are characterized in Propositions 3 and 4 below.
The results of these propositions are summarized in
Figure 1. Recall that the measure of market power, m, is
the reciprocal of the number of firms, 1/n. As drawn, the line
separating the strict liability and negligence areas intersects
the right—hand boundary. Therefore, for any degree of consumer
misperceptions, negligence is preferable to strict liability
if market power is high enough. However, depending on the
parameters of the problem, the separation line may intersect
the upper boundary. Then, of course, for some levels of con-
sumer misperceptions, strict liability is preferred at all
levels of market power. The line in Figure 1 labelled the
"optimal negligence line'L_defined below——also may intersect
the right-hand boundary or the upper boundary.
Proposition 3: Given positive consumer misperceptions,
X > 0, there exists a positive level of market power, m > 0,
below which strict liability is preferred to negligence and
above which negligence is preferred to strict liability. This
level of market power increases linearly with misperceptions
(unless it has reached the maximum value of one)
Proof: To determine social welfare under strict liability,
W, substitute the accident probability(3.7) and industry
output (3.9) underthis remedy into the social welfare func-
tion (2.3). Socialwelfare under negligence, WNI isdeter-
mined similarly. It is then straightforward to show that:








Note:When A =0,all three remedies are equivalent














(4.5) WN W as in [2 -a*)]
Q.E.D.
To understand this result, first recall thatstrict lia-
bility and negligence lead tothesameaccident probabilities.
Therefore, the only basis for preferring one orthe other is
differences in industry output. Because of consumermisper-
ceptions, output under negligence exceedsthat under strict
liability. When market power is zero,strict liability leads
to the first-best output and thus negligenceleads to excessive
output. However, if market power issufficiently high and
output under strict liability thereforefalls enough, the
larger output under negligence will bedesirable. Since
greater misperceptions lead to a greaterincrease in output
under negligence relative to strict liability, greatermarket
power is then required before negligenceis preferable.
Before continuing, it will be useful to definewhat is
referred to in Figure 1 as the optimal negligenceline. This
line determines, for each level of consumer misperceptions,
the level of market power at which socialwelfare under the
negligence rule is highest. When market poweris zero, recall
that output under negligence exceeds thefirst-best level.
As market power increases, output under negligencedecreases.
At some level of market power, it may equalthe first-best
output. If so, this level of market poweris on the optimal
negligence line. If output under negligencehas not yet
fallen to the first-best level when market poweris one, then
this level of market power is on the optimal negligenceline.
It is straightforward to show that the optimal negligence—20—
line is above the line separating the strict liability and
negligence areas--in fact, it has twice theslope.--'1 The
reason why it is above the line separating strictliability
and negligence is as follows. When market power is zero,
strict liability output equals the first-best output and
negligence output exceeds the first-best output.As market
power increases, output levels underboth remedies decrease
and the advantage of strict liability over negligencetherefore
decreases. When the level of market power reaches thelevel
defined by the optimal negligence line, negligence outputis
first—best and strict liability output is too small. Thus,
the switch from strict liability to negligence musthave
occurred at a lower level of market power.
Proposition 4: Given positive consumer misperceptions,
there exists a positive level of market power atand below
which negligence is preferred to no liability and abovewhich
either no liability or negligence may be preferred.This level
of market power is defined by the optimal negligenceline.
Proof: For a given A > 0, suppose m is less than or equal
to the level of market power defined by the optimal negligence
line. Therefore, > q*. It is always true that q0 >
Thus, since 2W/q2 =— <0,
(4.6) W(q aN) > W(q0, aN).
Recall that a0 > a =a*.Note that a* maximizes W(q,a) for
any q. Thus, since 2W/a2 =-c"(a)q< 0,
(4.7) W(q0la) > W(q0,a0).—21—
It follows from (4.6) and (4.7) that W1 >W0.
Since this holds
on the optimal negligence line, by continuityit also holds
for values of m just above the line. An example inwhich
>
WN
for some values of m above the optimal negligence
line is provided in section 5 below.
Q.E.D.
This result should not be surprising. When market power
is below the level corresponding to the optimal negligence
line, negligence output exceeds the first-best output.Under
no liability, output is even larger. Since theaccident proba-
bility under no liability exceeds the probabilityunder
negligence--which equals the first-best probability--nolia-
bility is worse than negligence on both accounts.When market
power is above the optimal negligence line,negligence output
is below the first-best output, so that the increased output
under no liability may make it the preferred remedy.
The results of Propositions 3 and 4 together provide a
more complete ranking of the remedies forvarious combinations
of consumer misperceptions and market power. Belowthe line
separating strict liability and negligencedefined by Propo-
sition 3, strict liability dominates both otherremedies—-it
dominates negligence by Proposition 3, and negligencedominates
no liability by Proposition 4. Above thisline but below the
optimal negligence line, negligence is the preferredremedy--it
dominates strict liability by Proposition 3 and it dominates
no liability by Proposition 4. Above the optimal negligence line,
either negligence or no liability may be the preferred remedy--
strict liability is inferior to negligence by Proposition 3.—22--
5.Welfare Analysis II
Without more specific assumptions, nothing further can
be stated about the choice between negligence and no liability
above the optimal negligence line. By providing two examples,
this section first shows that there may be a region in which no
liability is the preferred remedy, and then shows that no
liability may never be the preferred remedy.
The intuition that motivates these examples is as follows.
Both remedies determine social welfare through their effects
on the accident probability and industry output. With respect
to the accident probability, negligence is preferable since
it leads to the first-best outcome. With respect to output,
no liability may be preferable since, above the optimal negli-
gence line, output under negligence is less thanthe first-
best level and output under no liability is greater than under
negligence.In the two examples considered in this sec-
tion only industry output or only the accident probability
affects social welfare. When only industry output matters,
no liability may be preferred; when only the accident proba-
bility matters, negligence is preferred.
In the first example, it will be assumed that the acci-
dent probability does not directly affect social welfare.
This means that the full cost of the good is constant, i.e., it
does not vary with the accident probability:
(5.1) c(a) +a2=k,
where k is some positive constant. Obviously, in this example,
all accident probabilities are equally desirable.—23—
Under the negligence rule, let a <1be an arbitrarily
chosen accident probability used as the standard of care.
It is easily shown that firms will choose to just meet this
11/ standard: —
(5.2) aN =a.
Thus, industry output under negligence is:
(53) = ci— c(a)—(l—X)a2]=n[— k+Xa2
l+n [ Jl+nL
Under the no liability rule,the accident probability
selected by firms minimizes perceived full costs:
(5.4) c(a) +(l—X)a=k—Aa2.
Since perceived full costs decline with a,
(5.5) a0 =1.
Thus, industry output under no liability is:
— c(a)—(l—A)a01 — k÷
(5.6) q0 = ]
=
L
Giventhe accident probabilities and industry outputs
under negligence and no liability, social welfare for each
remedy can be determined by (2.3). A comparison ofthese
values leads to the conclusion that:
(5.7) Wa WN as m[] x,
where,recall, m =1/n.Note in particularthat ifconsumer
misperceptions are sufficiently small,there are levels of
market power such that no liability is the preferredremedy.—24—
Figure 2 illustrates this result, as well as the results
of section 4 in the context of this example."
The simplifying assumption in the preceding example was
that full costs were constant. This was inessential; by
continuity, a region inwhich no liability is preferred will
still exist if there is a unique minimum to full costs as
long as full costs are "close" to being constant. The negli-
gence standard a would then be assumed to be the accident
probability that minimizes fullcosts.--'
In the second example--which will show that no liability
may never be the preferred remedy——it will be assumed that





whereis some positive output and p is some positive price
exceeding full cost at the first-best accident probability.
Under the negligence rule with the standard of care
corresponding to the first-best accident probability, firms
will choose this probability, a*, and industry output will
be q for any level of market power.-" Under no liability,
firms will choose an accident probability, a0, greater than
a* because of consumer misperceptions, and industry output
will be q regardless of market power)' Since industry
output is the same under both remedies but the accident
probability is first-best only under negligence, negligence
is preferred to no liability for all positive levels of








Note: When A =0,all three remedies are equivalent




6. A Numerical Example
This section presents a numerical example which illus-
trates the results of the previous two sectionsand shows that
the various product liability remedies may resultin substantially
different levels of social welfare. For this example,let
the demand for a perfectly safe good be
(6.1) p =250—.OOlq,
let the loss from a product accident be
(6.2) P. =500,
and let the cost of production be
(6.3) c(a) =10—SOlog(a).
The first-best accident probability and industry
output are then .1 and 124,850. This leads to aproduction
cost of 125.15, an expected accident cost of 50, andtherefore
a full cost of 175.15. At the first-best output,the elasticity
of demand is -2.34.
Table 1 summarizes the welfare results for this example.
For combinations of consumer misperceptions and market
power below the heavy line, strict liabilityis the preferred
remedy. For combinations above it, negligence is preferred.
In this example, no liability is never the preferred remedy.
Each box in the table presents the percentage loss in welfare
from using the next most preferred remedy and the least pre-
ferred remedy, where S, N, and 0 stand for strict liability,






PercentageWelfare Loss from Using Less Preferred Remedies
(S =strictliability, N =negligence,0 =noliability)
consumer misperceptions
Note: Below the dark line, strict liability is the
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When there are no consumer misperceptions, recall from
Proposition 2 that the three remedies are equallydesirable.
It. is thereforenot surprising to see in Table 1 that when
misperceptions are low, the welfare loss from using the wrong
remedy is small. For example, when A =.1,the loss never
exceeds 4 percent. When misperceptions are large, the welfare
loss from using the wrong remedy is substantial. For example,
when A =1.0,the loss from using even the next-best remedy
may be as high as 45 percent. Over a broad range
of intermediate levels of misperceptions, the welfare loss
from using the second—most preferred remedy ranges from
5 to 15 percent. For example, when A =.5and m =.5,there
is a 10 percent loss from using strict liability rather than
negligence.—27--
7. Overestimates of the Accident Probability
The model of this paper can easily be used to analyze
product liability rules when consumers overestimate the proba-
bility of an accident. In this case,-'





wherethe equality in (7.2) occurs only when market power is zero.
Under strict liability, the accident probability is first-
best and industry output is too low to the extent that there
is market power for reasons already discussed. Under negli-
gence, the accident probability is also the first-best one
for reasons already discussed. However, because consumers
now overestimate the expected losses that remain, the output
of the industry is less than under strict liability. Under
no liability, the accident probability exceeds the first-best
level for reasons already discussed)1-" Output is less than
under strict liability for essentially the same reason as
under negligence——consumers view the full cost of the good
as higher than it actually is and therefore buy less. Output
is greater under no liability than under negligence because
only under the former rule do firms minimize the perceived
full cost of the good.
Thus, when consumers overestimate the accident probability,
strict liability is the preferred rule regardless of the degree
of consumer misperceptions and market power. Strict liability—28—
leads to the first-best accident probability, but to too
little output whenever there is any market power. Both negli-
gence and no liability worsen the problemof restricted output,
and no liability also leads to an excessive accident probability.
Note, however, that when consumers overestimatethe
accident probability, it may not be necessary to impose strict
liability on producers. Presumably producers would voluntarily
assume full liability through product warrantiessince con-
sumers would be willing to pay more than the actual costof
providing the warranty.-'—29—
8. Concluding Remarks
This section discusses several extensions and interpre-
tations of the analysis:
(1)If consumers are risk averse and do not have insur-
ance for product accidents, the effects of product liability
rules on risk bearing must also be taken into account. Assum-
ing that firms are risk neutral (or less risk averse than con-
sumers), then strict liability is preferable to both negligence
and no liability in this regard. Thus, strict liability
will be the preferred remedy for a wider range of consumer
misperceptions and market power than in the risk neutral case.
(2) It was implicitly assumed in the model that the
consumer could not affect the probability of a product acci-
dent. Allowing for this possibility does not change the com-
parison between strict liability and negligence provided that
a defense of contributory negligence is included with both
rules and consumers meet the corresponding standard of care in
order to avoid being contributorily negligent. In other words, if
consumers choose the same level of care under strict liability
and negligence, the comparison of these rules is unaffected.
It is not clear whether the rule of no liability will become
more or less desirable relative to the other rules when con-
sumers can affect the accident probability.
(3)The results of the paper can be applied directly
to situations in which the victim of the product accident is
a third party rather than a consumer of the product. It is—30—
easyto see that this situation is equivalent to the casein
which the consumer is the victim and completely underestimates
the accident probability.
Recall that, as consumer misperceptions increase, strict
liability becomes the preferred remedy over a wider rangeof
market power (see Figure 1). Thus, strict liability is more
likely to be the preferred remedy in situations in whichthe
victim is a third party.
(4)The analysis of this paper also canbe applied to
situations in which employees are exposed to workplace acci-
dents and the supply of labor is competitive. Under this
interpretation, employees are substituted for consumers and
the employees' wage rate is substituted for the price paid
by consumers. Lower wages correspond to higher prices.
If firms have market power in the labor market, then the
results of the paper apply immediately. For example, if
firms are strictly liable to employees for workplace acci-
dents, then firms will choose the first-best level of workplace
safety but will purchase less than the first-best amount of
labor. However, if firms are liable only if negligent and
employees underestimate the accident probability, firms
will still choose the correct level of safety but will now
purchase more labor, which could be welfare—improving.
If firms have market power in the product market, then
results analogous to those in the paper occur. For example,
it may be preferable to use negligence rather than strict lia-
bility to control workplace accidents in order to reduce the
priceof labor and thus increase output in the product market.—31—
(5)The social welfare function used in this paper did
not take into account the distribution of total welfare between
producers and consumers. It is straightforward to show that
when consumers underestimate the accident probability, producers'
profits rise as the product liability rule is changed from
strict liability to negligence, and from negligence to no
liability, and that consumers' surpluses fall with these
changes. Thus, if distributional considerations are thought
to be important, the conclusions of this paper might have
to be modified.—32—
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1) The results of Epple and Raviv (1978, pp. 83-87) that
are relevant to the present discussion are the ones when
consumers cn purchase actuarially fair insurance (or are
risk neutral).Although Hamada (1976) and Epple and Raviv
(1978) also consider consumer misperceptions, they do not
analyze the effects of misperceptions and market power simul-
taneous ly.
2) To our knowledge, the general idea that it might be
desirable not to place the full costs of accidents on monopo-
lized industries was first suggested by Calabresi (1961,
pp. 507—14) .Fora related discussion, see Shapiro (1982).
3) The qualitative results of the model remain true for
any downward—sloping demand curve.
4) The basic results of the paper--those in sections 3 and
4--hold for any perception function y(a) characterized by
underestimation, y(a) <a,and unresponsiveness, 0 y'(a) <1.—33—
(For the propositions in section 4, the measure of misperceptions
would then be A =(a*-y(a*))/a*,where a* is defined by
(2.5) below.) It is only when analytical
examples are constructed in section 5 and when the numerical
example is computed in section 6 that the assumption that
y(a) =(1—A)ais useful. For consistency, this form is
maintained throughout the paper.
5) This assumption implies that, given a level of consumer
misperceptions, the level of market power does not affect
the firm's choice of the accident probability; see section 3.
In general, market power might affect the choice of the proba-
bilityforreasons discussed, for example, by Spence (1975,
pp. 417—22)
6) It will be seen below that under this definition of
equilibrium, industry output increases from the monopoly
level to the competitive level as the number of firms increases.
Any equilibrium concept with this property would generate
the results of this paper.




q = j=1 ,i=1,...,n.
1
Sincethe right-hand-sides of each equation are identical,
qmust be the same for all i in anysolution. Let q1 be
this common value., Substituting q for each firm's quantity
in the n equations above yields (3.8).-.34—
8) See, for example, Brown (1973, pp. 331—35)
9) From (3.14), firm i maximizes its profits for any
q)by choosing a to minimize
c(a.) +(1—A)a.2, a. a*, 1 1 1
c(a.)+a.2,, a. >a*.
1 1 1
Inother words, firm i minimizes the sum of production costs
and "relevant" expected accident losses, where the relevant
losses are the consumers' perceived losses when they bear
their own losses and the actual losses when firm i bears the
losses. This sum has its minimum at a* for the following
reasons. It is decreasing up to and including a* because,
as shown in the discussion of no liability later in this
section, the minimum of c(a) +(1-A)a9occurs at a higher
probability than a*. It is rising beyond a* because the
minimum of c(a) +aoccurs at a*. Since c(a*) +(l_A)a*9,<
c(a*)+a*9,the result follows.
10) Industry output under negligence, isgiven by (3.16)
as a function of consumer misperceptions, A, and market power,
m (by substituting 1/rn for n). The optimal negligence line
is determined by setting q equal to q* and solving for m
as a function of A:
r a*2 A. — c(a*)—a*9.)
11)The argument is virtually identical to that discussed
in note 9 above.—35—
12) In this example, the optimal negligence line is:
ra9 1 m= I I A. — kj
Sincea <1,this line is flatter than the line separating
the no liability and negligence regions defined in (5.7).
The line separating the negligence and strict liability
regions has half the slope of the optimal negligenceline.
13) For example, let a be any accident probability between
zero and one. Assume that full cost at a is k —E for
some C> 0,that full cost at probabilities of zero and one
is k, and that full cost at other probabilities is determined
by joining these three points with two straightlines. Then
for any combination of A and m such that >inthe
example in the text, it is easy to see, that this welfare
ranking is preserved for sufficiently small .
14)Industry output will be q in equilibrium for thefollow-
ing reasons. Consider the output decision of an arbitrarily
selected firm. It views the aggregate output of the other
firms, ,asfixed. If <q,this firm can increase its
profits by expanding its output until industry output equals
q. If >q,this firm will produce nothing since the
price would be zero if it produced any positive quantity.
Other firms will make the same decision until industry
output falls to q.
15) Industry output will be q for the reasons discussedin
the previous footnote.—36—
16) These results follow from the analysis in section 3
with a perception function y(a), substituted for (l-A)a,
having the properties of overestimation, i(a) >a,and unrespon-
siveness, 0 ',''(a)<1.
17) Recall that this follows from the unresponsiveness of
perceptions.
18) For a discussion of voluntary product warranties which
complements the present analysis, see Courville and Hausman
(1979). In their model, when consumers overestimate the
accident probability, warranty coverage is complete and
producers provide the optimal level of reliability. When
consumers underestimate the accident probability, warranty
coverage is incomplete and the level of reliability is not
optimal. They show that these results do not depend on
whether the product market is competitive or monopolistic.